The 2023 reanalysis of the STAR*D depression trial found a cumulative remission rate of 35.0 percent after up to four antidepressant treatment steps, roughly half the 67 percent the original investigators reported in 2006. H. Edmund Pigott and colleagues reached the lower figure by following the trial’s own protocol: the blinded Hamilton depression scale as the outcome, and only patients eligible for analysis.1, 2
STAR*D matters beyond one trial because it shows a pattern. In the 1970s American psychiatry was fighting for its credibility, and it answered with numbers: checklist diagnoses that two clinicians could agree on, and a promise that biology would soon explain what the checklists described. Numbers bought agreement. They did not buy truth. My argument here is that an insecure profession inflates its headline figures, and that the inflation shows up on every side of the fight, including among psychiatry’s critics. The suffering behind the diagnoses is real. What deserves suspicion is the precision.
What the STAR*D reanalysis found
STAR*D (Sequenced Treatment Alternatives to Relieve Depression) was funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) at a cost of about $35 million.3 It enrolled 4,041 adults with major depression at 41 primary care and psychiatric clinics in North America. Unlike most drug trials, it took people who were already seeking care and allowed common medical and psychiatric conditions, so its results were meant to describe ordinary practice.1 Everyone started on citalopram. People who did not get well could move through up to three more levels, switching to or adding other medications, with cognitive therapy offered as an option at level 2. There was no placebo group at any stage.
The 2006 summary paper reported remission rates of 36.8, 30.6, 13.7 and 13.0 percent at the four steps and an overall cumulative remission rate of 67 percent.2 Those remissions were measured with the QIDS-SR, a 16-item self-report questionnaire collected at clinic visits. The protocol had named a different primary outcome: a score below 8 on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD), given by telephone assessors who did not know where the patient was in the study. The protocol also said that clinic-administered measures such as the QIDS-SR would not be used as research outcomes, because they were not blinded and were being used to guide care.1 The 67 percent was also a projection. As Pigott’s team points out, it assumed there were no dropouts and that people who left the study would have remitted at the same rate as those who stayed.1
The reanalysis made four changes, each taken from the investigators’ own protocol and design papers:1
- It used the blinded HRSD as the outcome.
- It kept only the 3,110 patients whose baseline HRSD from the blinded assessors was 14 or more, the threshold the investigators had set for analysis. The other 931 had been left out of the level 1 paper but folded into the later reports without clear disclosure, and they included 99 people whose baseline HRSD already counted as remission.
- It dropped 125 patients who already scored as remitted when they began their next treatment level, as the design paper had specified.
- It counted 370 people who left after their first visit without an exit HRSD as non-remitters, which is how the level 1 paper said its primary analysis would treat them.
With those corrections, 1,089 of 3,110 patients remitted: 35.0 percent. Adding 195 patients who had no exit HRSD but a final QIDS-SR score in the remission range raised the figure to 41.3 percent, which the authors call the best case. Remission fell at every step, from 25.5 percent at step 1 to 21.3, 13.2 and 10.4 percent. The protocol had predicted that 20.7 percent of patients would drop out over the four steps; 53.7 percent did. Because there was no control group, the reanalysis authors add, nobody can say how much of even the 35 percent came from the drugs, from placebo effects or from the passage of time.1
The 67 percent had a long public life, and it outlasted Pigott’s first critiques. In 2009 the NIMH director, Thomas Insel, writing with Philip Wang in a piece that called for better treatments, said that “at the end of 12 months, with up to four treatment steps, roughly 70% of participants were in remission.”4 A 2013 editorial in the American Journal of Psychiatry put remission after four well-delivered treatments at about 70 percent,5 and a 2022 New York Times article repeated a figure near 70 percent.1 Five of the original investigators answered the reanalysis in a reply titled “The STAR*D Data Remain Strong.”6 The protocol, the 3,110 eligible patients and the 35.0 percent are on the record. I have written about how this kind of slippage happens more generally in when evidence-based practice goes wrong.
The 3 percent figure, and what it does not mean
An earlier version of this post claimed a “2.7% sustained recovery rate” and called STAR*D a 97.3 percent failure. The 2.7 percent is a real number, but it comes from a different paper and means something narrower. In 2011 Pigott reported that only 108 of the 4,041 patients, 2.7 percent, remitted during acute care and then neither relapsed nor dropped out during the 12-month follow-up.3 The 2023 reanalysis did not examine the follow-up year at all, and its 53.7 percent dropout figure refers to the acute treatment steps.1
Counting every dropout as a failure is a worst-case reading. People leave studies because they feel better, because side effects are intolerable, because they move or because they give up, and the data cannot tell those apart. The 67 percent made the opposite assumption, that dropouts would do as well as the people who stayed. Neither is a measured recovery rate. By the reanalysis authors’ account, the original investigators themselves reported that 46.1 percent of the 1,729 patients with at least one follow-up assessment relapsed.1 The honest summary is that lasting remission after a sequence of medication trials was far less common than the headline said, and that the trial cannot tell us exactly how uncommon.
None of this shows that antidepressants do not work. A 2018 network meta-analysis, the largest of its kind at the time, pooled 522 trials with 116,477 participants and found that all 21 antidepressants studied beat placebo on response in acute major depression, with odds ratios from 1.37 to 2.13. Its authors rated the certainty of that evidence moderate to very low.7 That is a modest average benefit: real for some people, absent for others. The lesson of STAR*D is narrower. The benefit of moving from drug to drug, in real patients with real complications, was overstated.
If you take an antidepressant, nothing here is a reason to stop on your own. A 2024 meta-analysis of 79 studies estimated that, after subtracting the symptoms people also report when they stop a placebo, about one in six or seven people who stop an antidepressant get discontinuation symptoms. Severe symptoms occurred in 2.8 percent of people stopping a drug and 0.6 percent of people stopping placebo.8 Published letters have contested that estimate, so treat it as a rough guide. Any change belongs in a conversation with the prescriber.
An insecure profession reaches for checklists
A trial’s headline drifting that far from its protocol makes more sense once you know how badly psychiatry wanted clean numbers. Mitchell Wilson, working from the DSM-III task force archives and interviews with the people involved, describes postwar American psychiatry as organized around a broad biopsychosocial model shaped by psychoanalysis. Its weakness was that it did not clearly separate the mentally well from the mentally ill, and by the 1970s that weakness had become a crisis of legitimacy.9
The critics pressed on exactly that point. Thomas Szasz argued, beginning with a 1960 paper, that mental illness was a myth and that what psychiatry treated as disease were “problems in living.”10 Erving Goffman’s Asylums (1961) described the mental hospital as a “total institution” whose routines fixed the roles of inmates and staff alike.11 Comparative research added an embarrassment of its own. The US–UK Diagnostic Project, published in 1972, found that psychiatrists in New York used a much broader concept of schizophrenia than psychiatrists in London, so that patients called schizophrenic in New York would often have been called manic-depressive in London.12
Then came David Rosenhan’s “On Being Sane in Insane Places,” published in Science in 1973.13 Rosenhan reported that he and seven other people with no psychiatric history gained admission to 12 hospitals by saying they heard voices that said “empty,” “hollow” and “thud,” and that they then behaved normally. All were admitted. All but one were diagnosed with schizophrenia; the other was diagnosed with manic-depressive psychosis. Stays ranged from 7 to 52 days and averaged 19. Staff never identified a pseudopatient, though in the first three hospitalizations 35 of 118 fellow patients voiced suspicion. In a follow-up, a teaching hospital told to expect impostors judged 41 of 193 incoming patients to be fakes. Rosenhan had sent none.13
The American Psychiatric Association’s answer was a new manual. Robert Spitzer of Columbia University became chair of the DSM-III task force in 1974. He had sat on the US steering committee of the US–UK project, and his task force leaned on the Feighner criteria, research definitions for 14 conditions published in 1972 by a Washington University group whose work had been led by Eli Robins, Samuel Guze and George Winokur.14 DSM-III appeared in 1980 with 265 diagnostic categories in 494 pages and explicit diagnostic criteria that had been field-tested for whether clinicians agreed. Mayes and Horwitz argue that this shift to symptom-based categories was not a product of new scientific knowledge. It came from professional politics, growing government involvement in research, pressure from insurers to show that treatment worked, and the need of drug companies for specific diseases to market treatments against.15 The longer story is in our critical history of the DSM, and the question of where the manual goes from here is taken up in Is the DSM Dying?
The critics’ landmark study was inflated too
Rosenhan’s paper helped push psychiatry toward checklists. The historian Andrew Scull writes that it played a crucial role in persuading the APA to revise its manual and that it is still cited hundreds of times a year.16 It now appears it was not what it claimed. The journalist Susannah Cahalan went through Rosenhan’s papers for her 2019 book The Great Pretender and reported inconsistent data, misleading descriptions and quotations that did not match the medical records. She could identify only two of the eight pseudopatients, one of them Rosenhan himself, which left open whether the others ever existed.17 Working from records Cahalan shared with him, Scull concluded in 2023 that the study was “a spectacularly successful case of scientific fraud.”16
Spitzer had attacked the study’s logic back in 1975. He quoted the psychiatrist Seymour Kety: a man who secretly drank a quart of blood and came to an emergency room vomiting it would be treated for a bleeding ulcer, and that would not prove that medicine cannot diagnose ulcers.18 That critique was about inference. The newer one is about whether the data were real.
Put the two landmark studies side by side and the pattern is hard to miss. The study that told the public psychiatry could not tell the sane from the insane was inflated. The study that told the public that persistent medication switching gets two-thirds of patients well was inflated. One served the critics and the other served the establishment. Both came out of a field anxious about its own authority, and both traveled much further than their data could carry them.
Agreement is not truth: what Porter saw in numbers
The historian of science Theodore Porter gives a useful frame for this. In Trust in Numbers (1995) he turned the usual story around. Quantification did not spread into public life because it worked so well in physics. It spread because professional groups under outside pressure needed a kind of authority that did not depend on personal trust. “The appeal of numbers is especially compelling to bureaucratic officials who lack the mandate of a popular election, or divine right,” he writes, and “a decision made by the numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has at least the appearance of being fair and impersonal.”19 Porter calls the result mechanical objectivity and treats quantification as a technology of distance. He also notes that the strongest research communities, such as high-energy physics, lean less on explicit rules and more on trust among people who know each other’s work.19
Porter was writing about actuaries, accountants and engineers, not psychiatrists, so the application to the DSM is mine. It fits well. A profession whose judgment had been publicly embarrassed adopted explicit rules that any two clinicians could apply the same way. I take up the same tension in The Parachute Problem, on what a number can hold and what it cannot.
The architects of DSM-III knew the difference between agreement and truth. In 1974 Spitzer and the statistician Joseph Fleiss wrote that a classification has two properties, reliability and validity, and that “there is no guarantee that a reliable system is valid, but assuredly an unreliable system must be invalid.”20 Reliability was the problem they could solve. Steven Hyman, a former director of NIMH, later described the cost. The focus on reliability arrived when the science of mental disorders was “embryonic and could not yield valid disease definitions,” and the categories it produced became “epistemic blinders” that slowed progress toward valid ones.21
Even the reliability gain was smaller than advertised. In the DSM-5 field trials, run at 11 academic centers, 14 of 23 diagnoses tested good or very good, but six fell in the range the investigators labeled questionable and three in the unacceptable range.22 Major depressive disorder, the diagnosis STAR*D was built on, had a test-retest kappa of about 0.28, inside the questionable band.22, 23 The threshold itself is a convention: at least five of nine listed symptoms over the same two weeks, one of which must be depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure.24 A committee could have drawn the line at four symptoms or at three weeks, and a different set of people would have a disorder.
DSM-IV added another layer in 1994. Almost half of its criteria sets gained a clinical significance criterion: symptoms count only if they cause “clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” Spitzer and Jerome Wakefield found that the criterion was often redundant, sometimes useful against false positives, and frequently opened the door to false negatives.25 My own reading is that it quietly made functioning, including the ability to work, part of the definition of illness. In Adam Curtis’s 2007 BBC series The Trap, Spitzer acknowledged that by defining disorders through symptoms with little attention to the context in which they occur, the manual may have medicalized the normal experience of a significant number of people.26
The biology that was promised
The checklist was supposed to be temporary scaffolding, with biology filling in the causes. Nancy Andreasen’s 1984 book The Broken Brain: The Biological Revolution in Psychiatry named the hope.27 Four decades later the scaffolding is still standing. An umbrella review led by Joanna Moncrieff, published online in 2022, found no consistent evidence that depression is associated with lowered serotonin concentration or activity.28 That review drew a long run of published replies, some sharply critical of its methods, and it says nothing directly about whether antidepressants help. What it does challenge is the simple chemical-imbalance story many patients had been told. A 2023 review in World Psychiatry surveyed candidate biomarkers for autism, schizophrenia, anxiety disorders and PTSD, depression, bipolar disorder and substance use. Its authors wrote that after an enormous investment over the past 50 years, the overwhelming majority of candidate measures had not been shown to be reliable, valid and useful enough for clinical use.29
The earlier version of this post called these “fabricated diseases.” That was wrong, and it is worth saying plainly. Depression, panic and psychosis are not invented; people live and die with them. What the evidence supports is narrower. The boundaries between categories, and between disorder and ordinary distress, are conventions set by committees, and the biological explanations promised in the 1980s have not arrived as clinical tests. A category can be useful without being a natural kind. The mistake is treating it as more than that.
Two alternatives: HiTOP and the Power Threat Meaning Framework
The Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP) is the statistical repair. Its authors, led by Roman Kotov, build syndromes from the observed covariation of symptoms, group co-occurring syndromes into broad spectra, and measure all of it as dimensions rather than yes-or-no diagnoses. That approach targets the arbitrary boundaries, heavy comorbidity and diagnostic instability of DSM categories, and its authors call it a work in progress.30 HiTOP draws a better map of how symptoms cluster. It still describes symptoms. It does not tell you why a particular person has them.
The Power Threat Meaning Framework (PTMF) asks a different question. A group of senior psychologists, including Lucy Johnstone and Mary Boyle, developed it over five years together with activists and psychiatric survivors, and the British Psychological Society’s Division of Clinical Psychology launched it in January 2018.31 It treats what psychiatry calls symptoms as understandable, often protective responses to adverse environments, and it describes patterns in what people do rather than disorders they have.32 In place of “What is wrong with you?” it offers four questions: What has happened to you? How did it affect you? What sense did you make of it? What did you have to do to survive? Two more follow: What are your strengths? What is your story? The society describes the framework as a conceptual alternative to the diagnostic model, not a single model or approach.31
The two answer different failures. HiTOP fixes the statistics of the map. The PTMF restores the context that DSM-III deliberately set aside. In Porter’s terms, it gives up the technology of distance for the personal knowledge that numbers were adopted to replace.
What this looks like in therapy
None of this means a therapist can practice outside the diagnostic system. Insurance claims need an ICD-10 diagnosis code, and the system that supplies those codes has its own politics, which I covered in the ICD crisis. I have called the layer of intake forms, codes, prior authorizations and rating scales the administrative white coat. What we can control is how we hold it.
In practice that comes down to a few habits. A diagnosis is a working hypothesis and a billing requirement, and we tell clients which one we are using and why. Questionnaires such as the PHQ-9, which Spitzer helped develop, are useful for tracking change over time, and we treat a score as a prompt for conversation rather than a verdict. Alongside the standard intake we ask the kind of questions the PTMF asks: what happened, how it affected you, what you made of it, and what you had to do to get through. Those answers usually explain more than the code does. What goes into a chart also follows a person, which is one reason clinicians should understand how clinical notes are corrected.
Many people arrive after several medication trials and have started to believe they are the problem. STAR*D, read correctly, helps here. It shows that remission rates fell with each new medication step and that the original picture was rosier than the data.1 That is information about a treatment sequence, not about a person’s character or prognosis. We do not advise anyone to change or stop medication. We coordinate with prescribers and work on what medication rarely touches: the history, the meaning and the relationships wrapped around the depression.
The psychotherapy research points the same way. Across 295 studies and more than 30,000 patients, the strength of the working alliance between client and therapist correlated with outcome at about r = .28, and the relationship held across treatment approaches.33 That is a modest correlation, and correlation is not cause, but it is one of the steadiest findings in the field. It is one reason some researchers argue that the brand name of a therapy matters less than the field tends to believe, an argument made at length in The Map Is Not the Medicine. For people whose depression is bound up with questions about meaning, work or mortality, existential therapy treats those questions as the material of the work rather than as symptoms to be counted.
If you are in the Birmingham area and living with a depression that has not lifted after medication, or one you would rather understand before deciding about medication, our page on depression treatment in Hoover describes how we work. You can also contact us with questions before booking anything.
References
- Pigott, H. E., Kim, T., Xu, C., Kirsch, I., & Amsterdam, J. (2023). What are the treatment remission, response and extent of improvement rates after up to four trials of antidepressant therapies in real-world depressed patients? A reanalysis of the STAR*D study’s patient-level data with fidelity to the original research protocol. BMJ Open, 13(7), Article e063095. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2022-063095
- Rush, A. J., Trivedi, M. H., Wisniewski, S. R., Nierenberg, A. A., Stewart, J. W., Warden, D., Niederehe, G., Thase, M. E., Lavori, P. W., Lebowitz, B. D., McGrath, P. J., Rosenbaum, J. F., Sackeim, H. A., Kupfer, D. J., Luther, J., & Fava, M. (2006). Acute and longer-term outcomes in depressed outpatients requiring one or several treatment steps: A STAR*D report. American Journal of Psychiatry, 163(11), 1905–1917. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.2006.163.11.1905
- Pigott, H. E. (2011). STAR*D: A tale and trail of bias. Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry, 13(1), 6–28. https://doi.org/10.1891/1559-4343.13.1.6
- Insel, T. R., & Wang, P. S. (2009). The STAR*D trial: Revealing the need for better treatments. Psychiatric Services, 60(11), 1466–1467. https://doi.org/10.1176/ps.2009.60.11.1466
- Greden, J. F. (2013). Workplace depression: Personalize, partner, or pay the price. American Journal of Psychiatry, 170(6), 578–581. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.13030382
- Rush, A. J., Trivedi, M., Fava, M., Thase, M., & Wisniewski, S. (2023). The STAR*D data remain strong: Reply to Pigott et al. American Journal of Psychiatry, 180(12), 919–920. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.20230869
- Cipriani, A., Furukawa, T. A., Salanti, G., Chaimani, A., Atkinson, L. Z., Ogawa, Y., Leucht, S., Ruhe, H. G., Turner, E. H., Higgins, J. P. T., Egger, M., Takeshima, N., Hayasaka, Y., Imai, H., Shinohara, K., Tajika, A., Ioannidis, J. P. A., & Geddes, J. R. (2018). Comparative efficacy and acceptability of 21 antidepressant drugs for the acute treatment of adults with major depressive disorder: A systematic review and network meta-analysis. The Lancet, 391(10128), 1357–1366. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32802-7
- Henssler, J., Schmidt, Y., Schmidt, U., Schwarzer, G., Bschor, T., & Baethge, C. (2024). Incidence of antidepressant discontinuation symptoms: A systematic review and meta-analysis. The Lancet Psychiatry, 11(7), 526–535. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(24)00133-0
- Wilson, M. (1993). DSM-III and the transformation of American psychiatry: A history. American Journal of Psychiatry, 150(3), 399–410. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.150.3.399
- Szasz, T. S. (1960). The myth of mental illness. American Psychologist, 15(2), 113–118. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0046535
- Goffman, E. (1961). Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates. Anchor Books.
- Cooper, J. E., Kendell, R. E., Gurland, B. J., Sharpe, L., Copeland, J. R. M., & Simon, R. (1972). Psychiatric diagnosis in New York and London: A comparative study of mental hospital admissions (Maudsley Monograph No. 20). Oxford University Press.
- Rosenhan, D. L. (1973). On being sane in insane places. Science, 179(4070), 250–258. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.179.4070.250
- Feighner, J. P., Robins, E., Guze, S. B., Woodruff, R. A., Jr., Winokur, G., & Munoz, R. (1972). Diagnostic criteria for use in psychiatric research. Archives of General Psychiatry, 26(1), 57–63. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.1972.01750190059011
- Mayes, R., & Horwitz, A. V. (2005). DSM-III and the revolution in the classification of mental illness. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 41(3), 249–267. https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.20103
- Scull, A. (2023). Rosenhan revisited: Successful scientific fraud. History of Psychiatry, 34(2), 180–195. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957154X221150878
- Cahalan, S. (2019). The great pretender: The undercover mission that changed our understanding of madness. Grand Central Publishing.
- Spitzer, R. L. (1975). On pseudoscience in science, logic in remission, and psychiatric diagnosis: A critique of Rosenhan’s “On being sane in insane places.” Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 84(5), 442–452. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0077124
- Porter, T. M. (1995). Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objectivity in science and public life. Princeton University Press.
- Spitzer, R. L., & Fleiss, J. L. (1974). A re-analysis of the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 125(587), 341–347. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.125.4.341
- Hyman, S. E. (2010). The diagnosis of mental disorders: The problem of reification. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 155–179. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.3.022806.091532
- Regier, D. A., Narrow, W. E., Clarke, D. E., Kraemer, H. C., Kuramoto, S. J., Kuhl, E. A., & Kupfer, D. J. (2013). DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada, Part II: Test-retest reliability of selected categorical diagnoses. American Journal of Psychiatry, 170(1), 59–70. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.12070999
- Freedman, R., Lewis, D. A., Michels, R., Pine, D. S., Schultz, S. K., Tamminga, C. A., Gabbard, G. O., Gau, S. S.-F., Javitt, D. C., Oquendo, M. A., Shrout, P. E., Vieta, E., & Yager, J. (2013). The initial field trials of DSM-5: New blooms and old thorns. American Journal of Psychiatry, 170(1), 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.12091189
- American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). American Psychiatric Association.
- Spitzer, R. L., & Wakefield, J. C. (1999). DSM-IV diagnostic criterion for clinical significance: Does it help solve the false positives problem? American Journal of Psychiatry, 156(12), 1856–1864. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.156.12.1856
- Curtis, A. (Director). (2007). The trap: What happened to our dream of freedom (Television series). BBC Two.
- Andreasen, N. C. (1984). The broken brain: The biological revolution in psychiatry. Harper & Row.
- Moncrieff, J., Cooper, R. E., Stockmann, T., Amendola, S., Hengartner, M. P., & Horowitz, M. A. (2023). The serotonin theory of depression: A systematic umbrella review of the evidence. Molecular Psychiatry, 28(8), 3243–3256. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41380-022-01661-0
- Abi-Dargham, A., Moeller, S. J., Ali, F., DeLorenzo, C., Domschke, K., Horga, G., Jutla, A., Kotov, R., Paulus, M. P., Rubio, J. M., Sanacora, G., Veenstra-VanderWeele, J., & Krystal, J. H. (2023). Candidate biomarkers in psychiatric disorders: State of the field. World Psychiatry, 22(2), 236–262. https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.21078
- Kotov, R., Krueger, R. F., Watson, D., Achenbach, T. M., Althoff, R. R., Bagby, R. M., Brown, T. A., Carpenter, W. T., Caspi, A., Clark, L. A., Eaton, N. R., Forbes, M. K., Forbush, K. T., Goldberg, D., Hasin, D., Hyman, S. E., Ivanova, M. Y., Lynam, D. R., Markon, K., . . . Zimmerman, M. (2017). The Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP): A dimensional alternative to traditional nosologies. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 126(4), 454–477. https://doi.org/10.1037/abn0000258
- British Psychological Society, Division of Clinical Psychology. (n.d.). Power Threat Meaning Framework. Retrieved November 8, 2026, from https://www.bps.org.uk/member-networks/division-clinical-psychology/power-threat-meaning-framework
- Johnstone, L., & Boyle, M. (2025). The Power Threat Meaning Framework: An alternative nondiagnostic conceptual system. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 65(4), 800–817. (Original work published online 2018) https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167818793289
- Flückiger, C., Del Re, A. C., Wampold, B. E., & Horvath, A. O. (2018). The alliance in adult psychotherapy: A meta-analytic synthesis. Psychotherapy, 55(4), 316–340. https://doi.org/10.1037/pst0000172



























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