Two Psychologies from One Man: What the Spiritual and the Scientific Jungians Each Built, and Why
In an earlier piece, The Man in the Middle, I argued that Carl Jung spent fifty years standing between religion and science and managed to offend both. That essay was about Jung and the people who fought with him while he was alive. This one is about what happened after he died in 1961, when the people he trained had to decide what to do with a body of work that pointed in two directions at once.
They did not decide the same way. One group took the late Jung, the Jung of alchemy and synchronicity and the God-image, and built a psychology of meaning. Another group took the early Jung, the Jung of the laboratory and the clinic, and built a psychology of development and evidence. A third and a fourth position rejected both. All of them are called Jungian. They train differently, sit with patients differently, write differently, publish with different houses, and cite almost entirely different libraries. A reader who picks up one book from each could be forgiven for thinking they came from separate fields.
My claim is simple. The camps do not differ mainly in what they believe about God. They differ in what they will accept as evidence. Once a school settles that question, most of what it produces follows from the answer. This is a long piece because the subject needs one. It covers what Jung actually said and where he contradicted himself, how historians and philosophers have read the contradiction, each camp figure by figure, the institutions and money that hardened the split, the same clinical material read both ways, the writers trying to reopen the question, the place where all of this lands in a trauma practice, and a list of things that are commonly repeated about this history and are wrong.
A note on labels
The usual map of the field comes from Andrew Samuels, who in 1985 sorted the post-Jungians into classical, developmental, and archetypal schools. Wolfgang Giegerich’s work came later and makes a fourth. I am going to use “spiritual” for most of the classical school and “scientific” for the developmental school and its biological cousins. Both words are rough.
People often say “materialist” for the second group, and I have said it myself. Almost none of them are materialists in the strict sense. Michael Fordham was a clinician who kept the Self as a given. Jean Knox is a constructivist. George Hogenson and Warren Colman are emergentists. Erik Goodwyn calls his position biological and non-reductive. Anthony Stevens comes nearest to a biological determinist and even he treats religious experience as a real human capacity. Christian Roesler is the closest thing to a methodological naturalist, and he ends his major book by calling analytical psychology an interpretive discipline. What these writers share is a rule: claims about biology, anthropology, and history have to answer to the people who study those things.
The spiritual camp is not uniformly religious either. What unites it is the conviction that the psyche has a direction and a purpose, and that the proper response to a symbol is to deepen it and not to explain it.
One more correction belongs here. James Hillman sometimes gets described as belonging to the scientific or materialist wing, usually by people working from summaries. He was among the fiercest critics of the medical model, developmental psychology, and biological reduction that the field has produced. He was just as hard on the spiritual Jungians. He gets his own section below.
What Jung actually said
Both camps can quote Jung accurately in support of their position. That is only possible because he said both things, often within a few pages of each other, across his entire career. Anyone who wants to understand the split has to start with the texts.
The empiricist
Jung’s public account of his method is consistent from beginning to end. In the Terry Lectures at Yale in 1937, published as Psychology and Religion, he wrote “I am an empiricist” and said he kept to the phenomenological standpoint and avoided metaphysical or philosophical considerations. He illustrated it with a plain argument. An idea is psychologically true in the sense that it exists. If people everywhere report the image of a virgin birth, the psychologist has a fact to study and is not required to rule on whether such a birth ever occurred. As late as 1960 he was still telling correspondents that he made no transcendental statements and was essentially empirical, while adding that speaking of a God-image did not deny a reality beyond it.
The philosophical basis was a Kantian limit. We know appearances and not things in themselves. Jung applied it in two places. We know archetypal images, which appear in dreams and myths, and not the archetype as such, which he called irrepresentable. We know the God-image and not God. In Aion he wrote that the Self cannot be distinguished empirically from a God-image. In Answer to Job he wrote that we cannot tell whether certain experiences come from God or from the unconscious, and then added that the God-image does not simply coincide with the unconscious. Every one of those sentences has a careful exit built into it.
There is an older idea underneath, which Jung set out in Psychological Types in 1921. Medieval philosophers argued over whether universals exist in things or only in the intellect. Jung proposed a third location, the soul, and called it esse in anima. Reality as we ever meet it is reality in the psyche. This is the doctrine that let him say he was making no metaphysical claims while treating the psyche as the medium through which everything, including matter and God, becomes real to us. The theologian John Dourley pointed out the obvious problem. To say that the psyche is existence itself is already a metaphysical statement. The empiricism was a stance Jung adopted, and it was never a neutral description of what he was doing. I have written about his method and its three possible readings at more length.
The metaphysician who kept showing up
Against all of that stands the rest of the record. From 1913 until about 1930 Jung conducted a deliberate experiment on himself, provoking visions and writing down his dialogues with the figures in them. He copied the results in calligraphy into a red leather volume and painted the images. The Red Book stayed with the family until 2009. Its publication changed the argument in both directions. Spiritual readers finally had a primary document of Jung the visionary. Historians used it to show that the supposedly empirical concepts of the Collected Works, the anima, the Self, active imagination, were distilled from this private experience. The science was built on the visions and not the other way around.
In “On the Nature of the Psyche,” written in 1947 and revised in 1954, Jung said that the archetype in itself is transcendent, and for that reason he called it “psychoid.” The word means something like soul-like without being psychic. It names a layer where the distinction between mind and matter no longer applies. In the same essay he wrote that spirit and matter meet on the psychic plane, as two aspects that the psyche encounters and cannot get behind.
The collaboration with the physicist Wolfgang Pauli took this further. In 1952 they published a joint volume, with Jung’s essay on synchronicity next to Pauli’s study of Kepler. Synchronicity was Jung’s name for meaningful coincidences that have no causal link, an inner state matched by an outer event. In Mysterium Coniunctionis, his last major book, he revived the alchemists’ term unus mundus, the one world, for a unified reality that precedes the division into psychic and physical. He called the mandala its empirical equivalent and synchronicity its parapsychological equivalent, and he described the one world as at least a probable hypothesis. I have written separately about the Pauli collaboration and Jung’s metaphysics. The hedges are everywhere, and so is the idea being hedged.
The television interview
The best-known moment is from the BBC program Face to Face, filmed at Jung’s house and broadcast in October 1959. John Freeman asked whether he now believed in God. The answer usually gets compressed into a slogan about not needing to believe because he knew. What Jung actually did was pause, say the question was difficult to answer, and then say that he knew and did not need to believe. Later in the same interview, speaking about death, he said he needed a reason before adopting a hypothesis.
The letters that followed forced him to explain. A few weeks later he wrote to one correspondent that what he knew of was the existence of God-images, in general and in particular. In a letter printed in The Listener in January 1960 he said he had not stated that there is a God. So the mystical sentence went out on television and the Kantian footnote went out in the mail. Each camp remembers the half it prefers.
The autobiography that is not quite one
Much of the popular picture of Jung the mystic comes from Memories, Dreams, Reflections, published in 1962. Jung wrote some chapters and dictated material for others to his secretary Aniela Jaffé, who assembled the book. In 1960 he told a family member in writing that it should appear under Jaffé’s name because it was not an autobiography he had composed. The historian Sonu Shamdasani showed in the 1990s how much was edited, rewritten, and left out of the published text. Other scholars think Jung was more involved than Shamdasani allows, and the original interview notes have only recently been published in full. The safe conclusion is that the Jung of that book is partly Jung and partly a portrait arranged by people with their own views about how he should be remembered.
The biologist
Jung also never stopped using the language of biology. He spoke of instinct, of inherited brain structure, of patterns laid down over the history of the species. Critics accused him of believing that ancestral experiences are passed down as memories, which would be the discredited doctrine of Lamarck. George Hogenson has shown that Jung’s actual sources on evolution, James Mark Baldwin and Conway Lloyd Morgan, opposed Lamarck, and that Jung can be read as proposing something more defensible. Still, the biological vocabulary is there on the page next to the alchemical vocabulary, and the two are never reconciled.
His earliest work was plainly scientific. Under Eugen Bleuler at the Burghölzli hospital between about 1904 and 1910 he ran the word association experiments, timing patients’ responses to a list of words and noting where they hesitated or stumbled. From those disturbances he inferred the complex, a cluster of feeling-toned memories operating outside awareness. It remains the most empirically respectable idea he had. The whole course of his intellectual development runs from that laboratory to the alchemical library, and he never said that the second had replaced the first.
Why he never chose
There are four explanations and all of them are partly true. The first is strategic. Jung wanted medical and scientific standing and knew that open metaphysics would cost him both. Roesler borrows a phrase Habermas used about Freud and speaks of a scientistic self-misunderstanding. The second is philosophical. He took Kant seriously and believed that claims about things in themselves were not available to anyone. The third is biographical. He had the experiences recorded in the Red Book, he was a pastor’s son who had watched his father’s faith fail, and he could neither deny what had happened to him nor preach it. The fourth is methodological. His clinical rule was to hold the tension of opposites until something new emerged, and he applied the same rule to his own theory.
The cost was real. The analyst Robin McCoy Brooks has shown how Jung slides between “transcendental,” which in Kant means a condition that makes experience possible, and “transcendent,” which means a thing beyond experience. The first is a modest claim and the second is a large one. Jung moves from one to the other without marking the step. Roesler, following the Italian analyst Mario Trevi, puts the difficulty another way. Jung builds a system and then breaks it with his own experience, and the problem of the observer who is observing himself is never solved.
How scholars have read the contradiction
A large secondary literature exists on this one question, and it sorts into recognizable positions.
The historical reading belongs to Sonu Shamdasani. In Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology he argues that Jung was trying to found a science in the broad nineteenth-century sense, a general study of the human being that would include religion, anthropology, and philosophy, and that judging him by the narrower standard of later experimental psychology misses what he was attempting. Shamdasani and Hillman discussed the consequences of the Red Book in a set of conversations I have reviewed here.
The philosophical readings focus on Kant. Paul Bishop has traced Jung’s debts to Kant and German idealism in detail. Marilyn Nagy’s Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C.G. Jung shows him stepping into the old debate between realists and nominalists. Jon Mills presses the psychoid concept and asks whether it commits Jung to something supernatural and whether that can be defended. Roesler argues that Jung is a Kantian and a Platonist at once, and that the two cannot be made to agree.
The religious-studies readings divide sharply. Roderick Main treats Jung’s work on synchronicity as a serious resource for thinking about a world that has lost its sense of enchantment, without giving up critical standards. Murray Stein and Lionel Corbett read him as a psychologist of religious experience. Robert Segal reads him as a theorist of myth. Wouter Hanegraaff, a historian of esotericism, identifies Jung as the main bridge by which religion became psychologized and psychology became sacralized in New Age culture, while noting that Jung himself was no occultist. I have written about the confusion between Jung and the New Age that resulted.
The hostile reading is Richard Noll’s. In The Jung Cult and The Aryan Christ he presented Jung as the charismatic founder of a religious movement with roots in German nature mysticism. Shamdasani answered in Cult Fictions and took apart Noll’s central pieces of evidence, including a document Noll had identified as Jung’s founding address to his followers. Most scholars consider the cult thesis refuted. It stuck anyway, because it matched what skeptics already thought, and the question of Jung’s reputation remains an open trial.
At the far ends are two partisan books worth knowing about. Bernardo Kastrup’s Decoding Jung’s Metaphysics reads Jung as a philosophical idealist for whom mind is the fundamental reality. Peter Kingsley’s Catafalque presents him as a prophet in an ancient lineage whom the Jungians themselves have betrayed. Neither is mainstream scholarship. Both show how far the texts can be pulled.
The internal critics are Hillman, who thought Jung’s emphasis on the Self was monotheism in disguise, and Giegerich, who thought Jung was evasive and never managed to separate the empirical from the absolute.
The spiritual Jungians
What they took from Jung
The classical analysts treated Jung’s last twenty years as the destination his career had been heading toward. They took three ideas as foundational. The archetypes are real and autonomous, and at their deepest level they are psychoid. The Self is the center and totality of the personality and functions as the God-image. Individuation, the lifelong process of becoming who one is, is therefore a religious undertaking whether the patient uses that word or not. Jung said in a letter from the 1940s that the real interest of his work lay in the approach to the numinous and not in the treatment of neurosis, and the classical school took him at his word.
Marie-Louise von Franz
Von Franz met Jung at eighteen, worked with him for nearly thirty years, and did much of the Latin and Greek translation behind his alchemical books. Her own work covers fairy tales, alchemy, dreams, and number. In Number and Time she argued that the natural numbers are not human inventions. They are archetypes of order common to the psyche and to matter, which is why mathematics describes the physical world and also why number plays such a part in divination systems like the I Ching. On this view the study of dreams, fairy tales, and synchronicity is a study of the same order that physics studies from the other side. Her essays on the subject are collected in Psyche and Matter. Most of her books began as seminars at the Zurich institute. They proceed by taking a tale apart motif by motif and setting each motif next to its parallels, and they are the purest examples of the classical method in print.
Edward Edinger
Edinger was the leading American voice of the school. In Ego and Archetype, subtitled “Individuation and the Religious Function of the Psyche,” he described psychological life as a relationship between the ego and the Self joined by an axis that can be damaged. The infant begins identified with the Self. When that identification persists, the adult is inflated: grandiose, entitled, sure of being special. When the connection is broken, by neglect or trauma or the collapse of a religious container, the person is alienated and experiences life as empty and himself as worthless. Development moves in a cycle of inflation and deflation, and each turn makes the axis a little more conscious. For Edinger the outcome of a successful analysis is an experience that reorders a person’s whole view of life, the psychological equivalent of what earlier ages called finding God. In Anatomy of the Psyche he took the alchemists’ operations one at a time, burning, dissolving, coagulating, separating, and read each as a stage that recurs in treatment. It is still the clearest answer to the question of what alchemy has to do with psychology.
Erich Neumann
Neumann wrote the school’s grand narrative. The Origins and History of Consciousness, published in 1949, tells the development of the ego as a sequence of myths. It begins with the uroboros, the serpent with its tail in its mouth, an image of a state before any division between self and world. Out of that comes the Great Mother, who nourishes and devours. The ego frees itself through the hero’s fight with the dragon. Neumann named the force behind the whole process centroversion, an inborn tendency of the psyche to organize around a center. He held that the individual child passes through the same stages that humanity passed through in its history. Jung praised the book for doing systematically what he had only done in pieces. I have a longer account of Neumann’s psychology elsewhere.
The wider circle
Around these three stands a long list. Aniela Jaffé edited the memoir and wrote on Jung and the paranormal. Barbara Hannah taught active imagination and wrote a biography from personal memory. C.A. Meier ran the Zurich institute and studied ancient healing cults. Jolande Jacobi wrote the first systematic textbook of Jung’s ideas. Esther Harding carried the work to New York. Gerhard Adler edited the letters and defended the symbolic tradition in London. Marion Woodman brought the body and eating disorders into the work. Ann Ulanov and John Dourley wrote from within Christian theology. Jeffrey Raff pursued the alchemical imagination. Robert Johnson wrote the short books on myth that introduced a generation of American readers to Jung, and Robert Moore turned the archetypes into a map of masculine development.
Murray Stein and Lionel Corbett are the more theoretically careful heirs. Corbett has tried to describe a religious function of the psyche that depends on no creed and can be worked with clinically. David Tacey has argued for what he calls a postsecular Jung. His case is that the secular age is ending, that people are searching for meaning outside the churches, and that Jung offers a way to recover the sacred through inner experience without returning to dogma or fundamentalism.
Out past the edge of the profession are the popularizers, Joseph Campbell and Clarissa Pinkola Estés, and beyond them the New Age reception that most analysts would prefer not to be held responsible for.
What counts as evidence
For this camp the evidence for an interpretation is a parallel. A patient dreams of a snake swallowing its tail. The analyst knows the image from Egyptian papyri, Gnostic gems, and alchemical woodcuts, and the fact that it turns up across so many centuries is taken as a sign that the dream has touched something beyond the patient’s personal history. The technical name for this is amplification. The second kind of evidence is the felt quality of the experience. If the image carries awe, if it changes the patient, it is real in the only sense the school cares about. Neither kind of evidence can be falsified, and the classical analysts do not regard that as a defect. They regard the demand for falsification as a category mistake when applied to meaning.
What they made
The outlook produces a recognizable body of work. The methods are amplification, dream interpretation aimed at what the dream is for and not only where it came from, active imagination, sandplay, and close reading of fairy tales and alchemical texts. The genres are the seminar transcript, the mythic commentary, and the case history told as a journey with a destination. The citations are to Jung and then to scripture, myth, and alchemy. The publishers are small presses with devoted readerships: Inner City Books, Shambhala, Chiron, Open Court, Spring. The training institutes descend from Zurich. The audience includes analysts and reaches well past them to clergy, artists, people in midlife, and anyone who has had an experience their doctor had no category for.
The clinical setting follows from the theory. Classical analysis has usually been once or twice a week, face to face, with the dream as the main text of the hour. The analyst is something like a guide who knows the terrain and can tell the patient where others have been before. The goal is a working relationship between the patient and the unconscious that will outlast the treatment. The process as it is practiced is described in my piece on Jungian analysis.
What it cost
The criticisms are serious and most come from other Jungians.
Michael Fordham said the classical analysts neglected childhood and the transference. They could discuss a patient’s relation to the Great Mother at length and miss what was happening between the patient and the analyst in the room.
Roesler has documented how much of the classical literature rests on the belief that non-European peoples represent an earlier and less conscious stage of mind. Jung and Neumann shared that belief with their era. Anthropology discarded it long ago, and the passages are painful to read now.
The accounts of masculine and feminine principles, of anima and animus, assume that the sexes have fixed psychological natures. That assumption has dated badly.
The school has a habit, which Roesler calls an immunization strategy, of answering objections by saying the critic has not understood Jung. A theory defended that way cannot lose an argument and cannot learn from one either.
Noll’s cult thesis failed on the evidence, but the worry behind it has some basis. A method in which the analyst knows the meaning of the symbols and the patient does not gives the analyst a great deal of authority.
The sharpest attack on Neumann came from Wolfgang Giegerich in 1975, in a paper asking whether the development of the individual really repeats the development of the species. His objection was not that Neumann was too spiritual. It was that Neumann had taken a story about consciousness, presented it simultaneously as cultural history and as child development, and offered a myth as though it were a finding. The objection has never been fully answered, though Neumann still has defenders.
The scientific Jungians
What they took from Jung
The other camp remembered that Jung began with a stopwatch. The word association experiments gave him the complex, and the complex was measurable. This camp also noticed that Jung never stopped calling himself an empiricist, and they proposed to hold him to it. If archetypes are inherited, there should be a mechanism. If infants have a Self, someone should watch infants. If analysis works, there should be data.
Michael Fordham
Fordham founded the tradition in London after the Second World War. He had worked with children, which most Jungians had not, and he concluded that the infant is not floating in an inherited mythic sea. He proposed a primary self, a psychosomatic unity present at birth. That unity opens out toward the world to get what it needs and then closes again around what it has taken in. He called the two movements deintegration and reintegration. Repeated thousands of times in the first months, mostly in relation to the mother, they build the ego and the child’s first images of self and other.
Fordham drew freely on Melanie Klein and the British object relations tradition, used the psychoanalytic method of infant observation, and moved the transference and countertransference to the center of treatment. Analysis in his hands was less about amplifying a symbol and more about tracking, in fine detail, what the patient was doing with the analyst and what early failures of care that repeated. He was not a materialist. He kept the Self as something given from the start. What he changed was the method, and in doing so he changed what a Jungian clinic looked like.
Anthony Stevens
Stevens made the biological case in 1982 with Archetype: A Natural History of the Self. He went to ethology, the study of animal behavior in natural settings, and to the concept of the innate releasing mechanism developed by Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen. A chick crouches when a hawk-shaped shadow passes overhead, though it has never seen a hawk. The response is built in and waits for its trigger. Stevens argued that archetypes are the human versions of such programs, shaped by natural selection over the long history of the species, preparing each of us to recognize and respond to a mother, a mate, a child, a rival, a stranger. With the psychiatrist John Price he later extended this into an evolutionary account of mental illness.
Stevens removed the mystical aura and kept the inheritance. Later critics inside the camp called this the essentialism of the evolutionary position. He is the nearest thing in the field to a biological determinist, though even he treated the capacity for religious experience as a real product of evolution and not as an illusion to be dispelled. The question of why human beings are religious at all sits right on this border.
Jean Knox
Knox answered Stevens from inside the same camp. Her argument, set out in a 2001 paper and in Archetype, Attachment, Analysis, starts with genetics. The genome does not contain enough information to specify images or meanings, so symbolic content cannot be inherited. What can be relied on is development. Drawing on the cognitive scientists Jean Mandler and Mark Johnson, she proposed that what Jung called the archetype as such is an image schema, a very simple spatial pattern such as containment, path, or up and down. Every infant forms these in the first months because every infant has a body, lives in gravity, and is held by someone. They are not in the DNA. They arise reliably because the conditions that produce them are universal.
On this model symbolic meaning is an achievement, built on those early schemas through the relationship with caregivers. Knox joined this to John Bowlby’s attachment theory and to research on reflective function, the capacity to understand that oneself and others have minds, and she connected Jung’s transcendent function to that capacity. Her 2004 paper states the challenge directly: mental contents cannot be innate. Roesler has called hers the most sophisticated reformulation of the theory so far. She is a constructivist and an emergentist. Calling her a materialist gets her wrong.
George Hogenson, the systems theorists, and Warren Colman
Hogenson did two things in a 2001 paper. He showed that Jung’s evolutionary thinking drew on Baldwin and Lloyd Morgan, both opponents of Lamarck, which answered the old charge that Jung believed in inherited memories. The Baldwin effect describes how learned behaviors can change the pressures of selection on a population over long periods without any direct inheritance of what was learned. Then he used the same idea against Stevens. If patterns of behavior can be sustained by the interaction of organism and environment, they do not need to be stored in the genes. Archetypes, he concluded, are emergent properties of a developmental system made up of brain, environment, and narrative. There is no place where they can be said to be.
Peter Saunders and Patricia Skar made a parallel argument the same year from the mathematics of self-organization. A complex system fed a great deal of varied input tends to settle into a small number of stable patterns, which the mathematicians call attractors. On this account an archetype is such a pattern in the activity of the brain. It does not exist before experience. It forms in the course of it. Maxson McDowell and Joseph Cambray developed related ideas. Warren Colman, in Act and Image, shifted the weight again and located the source in symbolic culture, in the shared world of gesture, tool, and image that human minds grow up inside.
John Merchant
Merchant followed the logic to its uncomfortable end. In a series of papers beginning in 2006 he worked out a developmental and emergent model and tested it against the case of shamanism, which classical theory had treated as a showcase of inherited archetypes. He concluded that it is hard to find evidence for autonomous archetypes apart from personal emotional experience. He then asked whether, if archetypes are constructed out of development, the word still describes anything. He was not proposing to abolish it. He was asking the camp to be honest about how far it had moved.
Erik Goodwyn
Goodwyn is the dissenter within the scientific camp. In a 2010 paper he drew on Jaak Panksepp’s affective neuroscience, which identifies a set of emotional systems seated deep in the brain that all mammals share, among them seeking, fear, rage, and the distress of separation. Goodwyn argued that these give archetypes an inherited emotional core and bias human beings everywhere toward certain kinds of imagery, whatever their upbringing.
The exchange that followed is often described as Goodwyn against Knox. It was three against one. Knox, Merchant, and Hogenson each published a reply in the same journal issue, all critical, and Goodwyn answered them together. Knox’s reply was that feelings may arise in the older parts of the brain but symbolic meaning needs the cortex, and the cortex is shaped by learning.
Goodwyn has kept developing the position. The Neurobiology of the Gods appeared in 2012. In 2013 he proposed that recurring motifs are resonant states, story patterns that minds settle into because they fit the way human memory and emotion work, and he framed the idea so it could be tested. In 2020 he went after the genetic premise itself. A count of roughly twenty thousand protein-coding genes, he argued, says little about how much structure an organism can inherit, and the “impoverished genome” objection relies on a picture of genetics that the field has left behind. He describes his own view as a non-reductive biological approach. The argument between innateness and emergence is not settled, whatever either side says.
Christian Roesler
Roesler is the camp’s methodologist and its most thorough internal critic.
His first project was outcome research. For decades the standard complaint against Jungian therapy was that it rested on anecdote. Roesler gathered the studies that existed, most of them from Germany and Switzerland, where insurers pay for analytic treatment and want to know what they are buying. His 2013 review reports that patients improve on symptoms, on interpersonal problems, and on measures of personality structure, that the gains held at follow-up for as long as six years, and that treatment averaged about ninety sessions. One Swiss study of thirty-seven cases found a large effect on overall symptom severity and substantial change on a measure of personality restructuring. Some studies also found that patients used less health care afterward.
He is candid about the limits. These are naturalistic studies. Patients were followed through ordinary treatment with no control group, so the results show that people get better and cannot show that the therapy is the cause. Roesler says plainly that without randomized trials no conclusion about efficacy is possible, and he has called for those trials.
His second project is a critique of the theory. In a 2012 paper he asked whether archetypes are transmitted more by culture than by biology. In Deconstructing Archetype Theory, published in 2023, he argues that Jung’s single concept is really four separate claims: a biological claim about inheritance, an anthropological claim about universal symbols, a transcendental claim about a reality beyond experience, and a psychological claim about a universal process of transformation. He tests each against the relevant science and concludes that only the last survives. The book also contains a direct examination of the racism in the classical texts. It has drawn replies, including a defense of the evolutionary approach by Gary Clark in 2025 and a response from Roesler. I have gone through more of this literature in pieces on whether archetypes can be evidence-based and on how the theory has evolved.
Others in the camp
Ernest Rossi tried to connect Jungian ideas to the biology of gene expression and to hypnosis. Margaret Wilkinson, in Coming into Mind, brought the neuroscience of early relational trauma into Jungian clinical writing. Harry Hunt worked on the psychology of states of consciousness. Raya Jones criticized archetype theory from the standpoint of discourse and dialogue. Bruce MacLennan proposed an evolutionary neurotheology. Alan Maloney ran early empirical studies of responses to archetypal imagery. Iain McGilchrist is not a Jungian, but his account of the two hemispheres has been taken up by several, and I have discussed his work in another context.
The experiments
There is a small experimental literature. In 1991 David Rosen and colleagues showed 293 students a set of symbols, each paired with a word. When the word matched the symbol’s traditional meaning, the pair was remembered better than when it did not, even though the students could not consciously say what the symbols meant. Rosen took this as evidence of a collective memory. The result has been repeated in Australia, in German-speaking Switzerland, and with bilingual subjects.
The finding is intriguing and it is thin. Some pairings may simply be easier to remember because the symbol looks like what the word describes. The symbols were drawn from an archive curated by Jungians. A memory advantage in a pairing task is a long way from showing that anything is inherited.
In 2013 Leon Petchkovsky and colleagues in Australia gave Jung’s word association test to subjects inside a brain scanner. When a word touched a complex, they found a distinct pattern of activation. The main sample was twelve people. It confirms that the old test measures something real in the brain, which is worth knowing, and it should not be asked to carry more than that.
Dream research is another meeting point. Allan Hobson argued for decades that dreams are the forebrain’s attempt to make sense of random signals from the brainstem and therefore mean nothing in particular. Mark Solms showed that dreaming depends on the brain’s motivational circuits and can occur without the sleep stage Hobson’s theory required. Jungians have generally taken Solms’s side, since his findings leave room for the dream as a meaningful product. I have written about what dreams are from that angle.
What counts as evidence
In this camp the evidence for a claim is an observation someone else could repeat or a finding from a neighboring science. Infant observation counts. Attachment research counts. Reaction times, imaging, and outcome measures count. A parallel between a dream and a Gnostic text does not count for much, because it cannot distinguish between a pattern that is inherited, a pattern every child constructs, and a pattern the analyst has read into the material.
What they made
The methods are analysis of transference and countertransference, close attention to early relationships, and increasingly the vocabulary of affect regulation and mentalization. The genres are the clinical paper, the theoretical debate carried on over several issues of the Journal of Analytical Psychology, the infant observation report, and the outcome study. The publisher is Routledge. The citations run to developmental psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience. The audience is other clinicians and, more and more, the regulators and insurers who decide which treatments are paid for.
The clinical setting differs accordingly. The London tradition trained its analysts in four sessions a week, often on the couch, with supervision kept separate from the candidate’s own analysis and with the relationship between patient and analyst as the main object of study. A dream in this setting is first of all a communication about that relationship.
What it cost
The price is the one Merchant named. If the archetype is a pattern that emerges from early experience, the theory becomes hard to tell apart from attachment-informed psychodynamic therapy, and the word risks becoming idle. The numinous, which Jung thought was the point, turns into a subjective coloring on a developmental process. Critics from the classical side ask whether what is left is still Jungian. Hillman and Giegerich ask whether it is still psychology.
The outcome data are encouraging and fall short of the randomized trials the wider field treats as its standard. I have questioned that standard on other grounds, but the camp chose to be judged by it.
There is an irony at the end of Roesler’s work. Having tested the theory against the sciences and found most of it wanting, he concludes that analytical psychology is best understood as an interpretive discipline, a poetic science, closer to the humanities than to biology. That is very nearly what Hillman had been saying, from the opposite direction, for forty years. Roesler also credits Giegerich’s early critiques. The most empirical writer in the field ends up agreeing with its two least empirical ones about what kind of thing it is.
James Hillman and the third position
Hillman trained in Zurich, served as director of studies at the Jung Institute, and then spent the rest of his life taking apart most of what he had been taught. He called the result archetypal psychology. It belongs to neither camp, and the reasons are worth setting out in full, because he is the most misread figure in this history. I have a longer treatment of his work as a whole and another on his view of the ego.
Against the scientists
Hillman rejected experimental psychology, the medical model, developmental stages, and biological determinism, and he did so repeatedly and in strong terms. He thought the consulting room, with its diagnoses and case histories and its aim of building a stronger ego, had betrayed the thing psychology was named for. The word means the study of the soul, and he wanted the discipline to act like it. To explain a person by childhood was, for him, one fantasy among others, and a rather thin one. In The Soul’s Code, his bestseller from 1996, he proposed what he called the acorn theory. Each person is born with a particular character and calling, a daimon in the old Greek sense, and a life is better read forward from that calling than backward from its injuries. Trauma and symptom, on this view, may be the daimon’s way of forcing a person toward what he is for. The theory is a direct refusal of both nature and nurture as explanations.
Against the spiritualists
He was just as hard on the classical Jungians. Their emphasis on the Self, on wholeness, on the integration of opposites, looked to him like monotheism wearing psychological clothes. It gathered the many figures of the psyche under one ruler and called the result health.
His essay “Peaks and Vales,” first published in 1976, draws the line. Spirit, he says, loves the heights. It is drawn to unity, light, purity, and ascent, and it wants to rise above the confusion of ordinary life. Soul belongs to the valleys. It is moist, particular, attached to memory and place and other people, and it is at home in suffering. He took the phrase “vale of soul-making” from Keats. His complaint was that Jungians had confused the two and were trying to treat the soul’s troubles with spiritual disciplines aimed at transcendence. Psychotherapy and spiritual practice, he argued, are different activities with different objects.
Soul as a third thing
Hillman’s own term is soul, and he defined it as “a perspective rather than a substance.” It is neither matter nor spirit. It is a third thing between them, the imagining activity that turns events into experiences. He took the idea of a realm that is real without being literal from Henry Corbin, the scholar of Islamic mysticism who coined the word imaginal for it, and he drew as well on Renaissance thinkers such as Ficino and on Greek myth. In an important sense this is Jung’s esse in anima pushed as far as it will go. If reality is reality in the soul, then the soul’s images are the primary facts and everything else is commentary.
Many gods
From this followed a polytheistic psychology. The psyche, for Hillman, has many centers and no rightful king. Each of the Greek gods names a style of consciousness, a way of seeing and valuing, and each makes its claim on a person. The ego is one figure among them, the hero’s fantasy of being in charge.
When those powers are denied they come back as symptoms. Hillman called the soul’s capacity to produce illness, morbidity, and disorder pathologizing, and he treated it as a legitimate form of expression. The saying that the gods have become diseases is Jung’s, from his commentary on a Chinese alchemical text, though Hillman built so much on it that it is often credited to him. For Hillman it meant that a symptom should not be removed. It should be listened to and imagined further. He even objected to the term “the unconscious,” which he thought turned a population of living figures into a medical abstraction.
Stick to the image
The clinical method follows. Hillman held that the image is the basic datum of psychological life and cannot be reduced to anything else. To interpret a dream snake as a symbol of sexuality or the unconscious or the shadow is to replace a living thing with a concept and kill it. Working with Patricia Berry, he taught that the therapist should stay with the image as it presents itself: this snake, its color, how it moves, where it is, what mood it carries. That rule rejects the scientific reduction of the dream to brain activity and the classical reduction of the dream to a general symbol in the same breath. In practice archetypal psychology resembles literary criticism or the close looking of an art historian more than it resembles medicine.
What Hillman made, and what is said against him
The work is essays. The Myth of Analysis, Re-Visioning Psychology, which began as the same Yale lecture series Jung had given thirty-five years earlier, The Dream and the Underworld, and decades of the journal Spring. The prose is rhetorical, learned, and deliberately unsystematic. The institutional home became Pacifica Graduate Institute in California, and the readership is strongest among writers, artists, and scholars in the humanities.
The objections are that the approach is clinically thin, that it suits the educated and articulate and offers little to someone in acute distress, and that it has no way to say when a patient is getting better. David Tacey has argued that Hillman’s own writing about the eternal youth brings spirit back in by a side door. Giegerich’s objection is the most fundamental and comes next.
Wolfgang Giegerich and the fourth position
Giegerich began as a contributor to Hillman’s journal and ended as the severest critic of all three schools. He calls his approach psychology as the discipline of interiority, and he builds it on Hegel’s dialectical logic.
The neurosis of psychology
His starting point is that psychology suffers from a neurosis of its own. In the natural sciences the observer and the thing observed are separate. Psychology copies that arrangement and treats the unconscious as an object, something inside a person or inside a brain, that can be examined from outside. But in psychology the one doing the examining is the soul, and the thing examined is also the soul. Any account that places the soul in a location, whether an inner world set against an outer one or a biological mechanism, has already misunderstood what it is dealing with. For Giegerich the consulting room, the preoccupation with the patient’s personal feelings, and the search for techniques are all ways of avoiding this. The soul in his sense is not personal. It is the logic of a culture’s consciousness as it unfolds through history.
Against Jung and against Hillman
He charges Jung with nostalgia. Humanity, he argues, has passed through a real historical break. The gods and myths that once held people have lost their hold and cannot be brought back. Jung saw this and could not accept it, so he tried to rediscover the sacred inside the individual psyche, dressing modern people in the costumes of dead religions. Giegerich reads Answer to Job as the clearest case. He also holds that Jung was evasive about what he was doing and never separated the empirical from the absolute.
He agrees with Hillman that psychology must turn away from biology, and then says Hillman stopped halfway. An image is still an immediate, sensuous thing. To stay with the image is to stay at the level of picture-thinking and never arrive at thought. In his words that keeps the soul in childhood.
Logical life
What he proposes instead is that the image be sublated, Hegel’s term for a movement that cancels something, preserves it, and raises it to another level all at once. The soul is logical life, where logic means the inner structure of meaning working itself out and has nothing to do with calculation. To think psychologically is to follow a phenomenon all the way through until its literal and pictorial forms dissolve and its inner logic shows. He calls this absolute negativity. Thoughts of this kind, he says, are not the ego’s products. They think themselves.
What Giegerich made
The Soul’s Logical Life appeared in 1998, and his collected English papers run to several volumes, the first titled The Neurosis of Psychology. The work is theory, dense and uncompromising. It contains almost no technique and no manuals, because from his standpoint both outcome studies and fairy tale amplification are failures to think. He has a small and committed following organized in an international society. The objection to him is the obvious one. Very few clinicians know what to do with it on a Tuesday afternoon.
The same material, seen four ways
The differences are easiest to see when the schools are handed the same thing.
| Material | Spiritual reading | Scientific reading |
|---|---|---|
| A dream | Amplified through myth and alchemy. The question is what the dream is aiming at. | Read within the relationship to the analyst and the patient’s history. The question is what the dream regulates or communicates. |
| A symptom | A summons toward individuation. Something is demanding attention. | A defense or a deficit with a developmental origin, usually in early attachment. |
| Trauma | An archetypal system of inner figures protecting the core of the person. | Dissociation, implicit memory, and failures of affect regulation. |
| Synchronicity | A glimpse of the unity underlying mind and matter. | Emergent pattern, meaning-making under pressure, or a matter outside the reach of science. |
| The Self | The God-image within, to which the ego must find its right relation. | A primary unity present at birth, or an emergent property of a self-organizing system. |
| The mother archetype | A universal figure with a nourishing and a devouring face. | An evolved readiness to attach, a schema built from being held, or a culturally transmitted image. |
| Religion | The natural expression of the psyche’s religious function. | An evolved or culturally transmitted human capacity. |
| Psychosis | The ego flooded by archetypal contents that carry meaning. | Complexes whose activation can be measured in association tests and imaging. |
Hillman would refuse both columns. Faced with the dream he would ask the dreamer to describe the image again, more exactly, and would resist any move to say what it stands for. Faced with the symptom he would ask which god is in it. Giegerich would say that all three responses remain attached to the patient’s private material and that the real question is what the dream shows about the state of consciousness in the culture that produced it.
Why the split followed institutional lines
Ideas do not separate people as reliably as training does.
The Society of Analytical Psychology was founded in London in the mid-1940s under Fordham’s influence. Its members worked beside Kleinians and Freudians in British hospitals and clinics and absorbed psychoanalytic technique because it was the common clinical language around them. The C.G. Jung Institute opened near Zurich in 1948, with Jung alive and von Franz teaching, and it trained people in mythology, comparative religion, fairy tale, and dream interpretation. A candidate in London spent years learning to track the transference. A candidate in Zurich spent years learning to recognize a motif.
The strain showed. In the mid-1970s Gerhard Adler led a group out of the London society to found a new association whose purpose was to keep the symbolic and spiritual side of the work alive alongside the developmental. That association split again in 1982. London ended with four separate Jungian bodies, which later formed an umbrella group so they could at least speak to regulators with one voice. Ann Casement’s history of these splits is the standard account. Zurich had its own schisms. One of the bodies that emerged there is devoted specifically to depth psychology as Jung and von Franz practiced it, and another split from the original institute in the 2000s. In the United States the archetypal lineage settled at Pacifica, which is part of why Hillman’s influence is stronger among American academics and writers than among licensed analysts.
Money and regulation pushed in the same direction. Where insurers fund treatment, as in Germany, Jungians had to produce outcome studies or lose their standing, and institutes in Zurich, Berlin, and San Francisco began collecting data. Systems built around evidence-based practice reward what the scientific camp produces. The spiritual camp has leaned instead on book sales, lectures, and patients who pay directly, and on the large public appetite for writing about meaning. I have written critically about the incentive structure behind evidence-based practice and about whether it is science or something that only resembles it. In this case it deserves credit for forcing one honest question on the field, which is whether patients get better.
Typology, the piece that got away
One part of Jung’s work escaped every camp. His theory of psychological types was turned into a questionnaire by Katharine Briggs and Isabel Myers and became one of the most widely used personality instruments in the world. It is the most thoroughly operationalized thing Jung ever produced, and academic psychologists have little respect for its measurement properties. Analysts of every school mostly ignore it. It lives in corporate training rooms. What survives of a thinker is not always what his students valued. I looked at the personality theories that came out of Jung in an earlier series.
The people trying to reopen the question
A smaller group has spent the last two decades trying to get back to the ground Jung stood on, with better tools.
The first approach starts from Pauli. The physicist and philosopher Harald Atmanspacher has given the late Jung’s position a name, dual-aspect monism, and a formal statement. Mind and matter are complementary aspects of one underlying reality that is neither, and that cannot be reached directly by measurement. He calls this the Pauli-Jung conjecture, and the word conjecture is deliberate. Roderick Main and Joseph Cambray work in the same territory, Main from the study of religion and Cambray from the science of complex systems, where synchronicity can be described as the kind of ordered pattern that appears when a system organizes itself.
The second approach comes up from biology. Hogenson and Colman treat the archetype as emergent. Goodwyn treats it as a resonant pattern with an inherited emotional core. None of them thinks a god is a gene, and none thinks the experience of the numinous has been explained away once a mechanism is described. Work outside the field is moving the same way, and I have argued that computational neuroscience has quietly rehabilitated Jung.
There are other candidates for the middle. Kastrup’s idealism resolves the tension by making mind fundamental. Mills leaves the psychoid as an open philosophical question. Each is an attempt to say how spirit and matter relate without folding one into the other, which was the problem Jung declined to solve.
What a working clinician does with all this
In a trauma practice these psychologies are not rivals. They are tools for different phases of the same treatment.
Wilkinson and others in the scientific camp have translated Jung’s complex theory into the language of Allan Schore’s work on right-brain development and affect regulation. In a 1934 essay Jung described complexes as splinter psyches that behave like separate personalities. That sits comfortably beside modern accounts of structural dissociation and beside Internal Family Systems, whose founder arrived at his model by his own route. The resemblance to Jung is strong, and the direct line of descent is asserted more often than it is documented. The Self in that model has the same double character as Jung’s. It is a clinical function and something spoken of in nearly religious terms. Our own parts-based work draws on both sources.
When a client is overwhelmed, the scientific framework is the one I need. It tells me what the nervous system is doing and why insight will not help until the body is calmer. It is why we use brainspotting, EMDR, Somatic Experiencing, and brain mapping at Taproot. Roesler’s stripped-down version of archetype theory, a universal process of transformation with stages, fits phase-oriented trauma treatment well.
Donald Kalsched comes from the other side. He describes how the psyche of a traumatized child splits into a guarded innocent core and the figures that guard it, figures that protect and then persecute. He insists that these are archetypal and not simply internalized parents, and that what they guard is something like spirit. Clients recognize themselves in that description in a way they rarely do in a diagram of the limbic system. Later in treatment, when the question shifts from how to get through the day to what the suffering meant, this is the framework with something to say, and it is the heart of Jungian depth therapy. Kalsched grounds his account in Schore and McGilchrist, which makes him the best living example of a clinician using both libraries. I compared the lineages in a piece on post-Freudian and post-Jungian views of trauma.
Each tool has a characteristic way of going wrong. The spiritual frame can make a defense sacred. A voice that tells a client to stay hidden may feel like a guardian, and a therapist who meets it only with reverence can end up helping the client stay hidden. Kalsched’s own cases show the protector becoming the persecutor. The scientific frame can stabilize a person and leave her with no account of her life that she can bear to tell. The field’s move from analytical to experiential methods is, at its best, an attempt to keep both frames in the room.
The stakes were clearest to me early in my career, working with people diagnosed with schizophrenia. A man says a presence speaks to him. Treating that only as chemistry ends the conversation, and so does treating it only as revelation. What that work taught me is that the clinician has to be able to hold both descriptions long enough to hear what the person is saying.
The strongest case for each side
For the spiritual camp: Jung’s late work and the Red Book show what he himself considered central. Remove the numinous and what is left is ordinary psychodynamic therapy with a Jungian vocabulary. People come to this work because something happened to them that felt larger than their biography, and a psychology that cannot speak to that has failed them.
Against it: the assumptions about culture and gender, the impossibility of testing any of it, the reliance on a memoir shaped by other hands, and the authority the method gives the analyst.
For the scientific camp: a claim about genes, infants, or the history of religion is a claim about the world and has to be checked against what is known. Jung himself asked to be judged as an empiricist. Patients and the people who pay for treatment are owed evidence that it helps.
Against it: the question of whether what remains is Jungian, the risk that emergence makes the archetype an empty word, the fact that the genetic argument against innateness is itself disputed, and the absence so far of controlled trials.
For Hillman and Giegerich: both camps take literally what should be understood psychologically. One turns the image into a metaphysical fact and the other turns it into a biological one. The proper object of psychology is soul, or thought, and neither camp is studying it.
Against them: clinical thinness, a readership limited to the highly educated, and in Hillman’s case the charge that spirit comes back in through his own favorite themes.
Things commonly said about this history that are wrong
That Hillman was a scientific materialist. He opposed the medical and developmental models as strongly as anyone in the field, and opposed spiritual transcendence as well.
That the developmental school is materialist. Fordham, Knox, Hogenson, Colman, and Goodwyn all reject reduction in one way or another. “Developmental,” “emergentist,” and “biological” are more accurate words.
That Jung said he did not need to believe in God because he knew, and left it there. He paused and called the question difficult, and within weeks he explained in writing that he meant he knew of God-images.
That Memories, Dreams, Reflections is Jung’s autobiography. He said it should not be presented as one.
That Jung believed in inherited memories. His sources on evolution rejected that doctrine, and his own statements are more ambiguous than the charge allows.
That the genome is too small for archetypes, and the matter is closed. Several leading critics have made that argument. Goodwyn has challenged its premise, and the debate continues.
That the innateness debate was Goodwyn against Knox. Three critics replied to him in the same issue.
That the Baldwin effect supports inherited archetypes. Hogenson used it to defend Jung against the charge of Lamarckism and to move archetypes out of the genes.
That outcome studies have proven Jungian therapy works. They show patients improve substantially and stay improved. Without control groups they cannot show why, and the researcher who compiled them says so.
That “the gods have become diseases” is Hillman’s line. It is Jung’s.
That Noll proved Jung founded a cult. His main evidence did not survive examination.
A short chronology
- 1904 to 1910: Jung’s word association experiments at the Burghölzli
- 1912 to 1913: the break with Freud; the Red Book period begins
- 1919: Jung first uses the term archetype
- 1921: Psychological Types
- 1937: the Terry Lectures at Yale
- 1945 to 1946: the Society of Analytical Psychology founded in London
- 1947: “On the Nature of the Psyche” and the psychoid archetype
- 1948: the C.G. Jung Institute opens in Zurich
- 1949: Neumann’s The Origins and History of Consciousness
- 1952: Answer to Job, the synchronicity essay, and the exchange with Buber
- 1955: the rupture with Victor White; Mysterium Coniunctionis begins to appear
- 1959: the BBC interview
- 1961: Jung dies
- 1962: Memories, Dreams, Reflections
- 1972: Edinger’s Ego and Archetype
- 1975: Hillman’s Re-Visioning Psychology; Giegerich’s critique of Neumann
- 1975 to 1977: the first London split
- 1982: Stevens’s Archetype; the second London split
- 1985: Samuels’s Jung and the Post-Jungians
- 1994 to 1998: Noll’s books and Shamdasani’s reply
- 1996: Kalsched’s The Inner World of Trauma; Hillman’s The Soul’s Code
- 1998: Giegerich’s The Soul’s Logical Life
- 2001: Hogenson on the Baldwin effect; Knox on image schemas; Saunders and Skar on self-organization
- 2009: the Red Book is published
- 2010: the Goodwyn exchange
- 2013: Roesler’s review of outcome research
- 2019: a special issue of the Journal of Analytical Psychology on the archetype controversy
- 2023: Roesler’s Deconstructing Archetype Theory
What each camp could not have built without letting go
It is easy to tell this story as a loss, the breaking of something Jung held together. I do not think that is quite right. Jung held it together partly by being vague, and vagueness does not produce research programs. The spiritual Jungians could write the great commentaries on fairy tale and alchemy because they stopped worrying about whether any of it could be proven. The scientific Jungians could do infant observation and outcome research because they stopped worrying about whether the result would still feel like Jung. Hillman could write as he did because he gave up on cure. Giegerich could think as he does because he gave up on the clinic. Each bought its productivity by releasing part of the inheritance.
The trouble is that a patient does not arrive as a fraction of a person. She has a nervous system shaped by her first years, and she has dreams that seem to know more than she does. A psychology adequate to her has to be answerable to the evidence and able to take the dream seriously. The writers I find most promising now are the ones working back toward the ground Jung occupied, with better instruments and fewer illusions than he had. The argument about how he came to stand there, and who attacked him for it, is in the companion essay. The rest of our writing on these figures is collected in the Jungian psychology resource library.
Sources and further reading
Jung
- Studies in Word Association, Collected Works vol. 2
- Psychological Types (1921), Collected Works vol. 6
- “A Review of the Complex Theory” (1934) and “On the Nature of the Psyche” (1947/1954), Collected Works vol. 8
- Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle (1952), Collected Works vol. 8
- Aion (1951), Collected Works vol. 9ii
- Psychology and Religion (1937) and Answer to Job (1952), Collected Works vol. 11
- Mysterium Coniunctionis (1955-56), Collected Works vol. 14
- The Red Book: Liber Novus, edited by Sonu Shamdasani (2009)
- Letters, edited by Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffé, 2 vols.
- The Jung-White Letters, edited by Ann Conrad Lammers and Adrian Cunningham (2007)
On Jung’s position
- Sonu Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology (2003); Cult Fictions (1998); “Memories, Dreams, Omissions,” Spring (1995)
- Marilyn Nagy, Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C.G. Jung (1991)
- Roderick Main, The Rupture of Time (2004); Breaking the Spell of Disenchantment (2022)
- Robin McCoy Brooks, “Un-thought out metaphysics in analytical psychology,” Journal of Analytical Psychology (2011)
- Jon Mills, Jung and Philosophy (2019)
- Harald Atmanspacher, “The Pauli-Jung Conjecture and Its Relatives,” Open Philosophy (2020)
- Joseph Cambray, Synchronicity: Nature and Psyche in an Interconnected Universe (2009)
- Richard Noll, The Jung Cult (1994)
- Wouter Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture (1996)
- Bernardo Kastrup, Decoding Jung’s Metaphysics (2021)
- Peter Kingsley, Catafalque (2018)
The spiritual and classical tradition
- Marie-Louise von Franz, Number and Time (1970; English 1974); Psyche and Matter
- Edward Edinger, Ego and Archetype (1972); Anatomy of the Psyche (1985)
- Erich Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness (1949; English 1954)
- Wolfgang Giegerich, “Ontogeny = Phylogeny? A Fundamental Critique of Erich Neumann’s Analytical Psychology,” Spring (1975)
- Lionel Corbett, The Religious Function of the Psyche (1996)
- Murray Stein, Jung’s Treatment of Christianity (1985); Jung’s Map of the Soul (1998)
- David Tacey, The Postsecular Sacred (2019)
- Donald Kalsched, The Inner World of Trauma (1996); Trauma and the Soul (2013)
The developmental and scientific tradition
- Andrew Samuels, Jung and the Post-Jungians (1985)
- Anthony Stevens, Archetype: A Natural History of the Self (1982); with John Price, Evolutionary Psychiatry (1996)
- Jean Knox, “Memories, fantasies, archetypes,” Journal of Analytical Psychology (2001); Archetype, Attachment, Analysis (2003); “From archetypes to reflective function” (2004)
- George Hogenson, “The Baldwin effect: a neglected influence on C.G. Jung’s evolutionary thinking,” Journal of Analytical Psychology (2001)
- Peter Saunders and Patricia Skar, “Archetypes, complexes and self-organization,” Journal of Analytical Psychology (2001)
- John Merchant, “The developmental/emergent model of archetype” (2006) and “A reappraisal of classical archetype theory” (2009), Journal of Analytical Psychology
- Erik Goodwyn, “Approaching archetypes: reconsidering innateness,” Journal of Analytical Psychology (2010), with responses; The Neurobiology of the Gods (2012); “Archetypes and the ‘Impoverished Genome’ argument” (2020)
- Warren Colman, Act and Image (2016)
- Margaret Wilkinson, Coming into Mind (2006)
- Christian Roesler, “Are archetypes transmitted more by culture than biology?” Journal of Analytical Psychology (2012); “Evidence for the Effectiveness of Jungian Psychotherapy,” Behavioral Sciences (2013); Deconstructing Archetype Theory (2023)
- David Rosen et al., “Empirical study of associations between symbols and their meanings,” Journal of Analytical Psychology (1991)
- Leon Petchkovsky et al., “fMRI responses to Jung’s Word Association Test,” Journal of Analytical Psychology (2013)
- Ann Casement, “A Brief History of Jungian Splits in the United Kingdom,” Journal of Analytical Psychology (1995)
Hillman and Giegerich
- James Hillman, The Myth of Analysis (1972); Re-Visioning Psychology (1975); “Peaks and Vales” (1976); The Dream and the Underworld (1979); The Soul’s Code (1996)
- Patricia Berry, Echo’s Subtle Body (1982)
- Wolfgang Giegerich, The Soul’s Logical Life (1998); The Neurosis of Psychology, Collected English Papers vol. 1 (2005)
Tags: Carl Jung, post-Jungian schools, classical Jungian analysis, developmental school, archetype theory, James Hillman, Wolfgang Giegerich, Marie-Louise von Franz, Edward Edinger, Michael Fordham, Jean Knox, Christian Roesler, depth psychology, trauma therapy, Jungian therapy Birmingham





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