Carl Jung built analytical psychology out of a long philosophical inheritance. Kant gave him a discipline about what the mind can know. The German Romantics gave him an unconscious that creates rather than just stores. Schopenhauer gave him a blind, impersonal will, and Nietzsche gave him both a model and a warning. Around and after him, a circle of philosophers took up the same questions, from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to Bachelard, Corbin and Gebser. Some drew on Jung directly. Others reached similar ground by their own roads.
This guide walks through both groups: the thinkers behind Jung, whose books shaped his ideas, and the thinkers around him, whose work deepens, tests or extends them. Each name links to a longer article on that thinker.

Jung also named his own sources. Looking back on his early years, he wrote that “mentally my greatest adventure had been the study of Kant and Schopenhauer.”4 In his essay on the child archetype, he credited Leibniz, Kant and Schelling with pointing to “the dark side of the psyche.” He then singled out a physician, Carl Gustav Carus, who pointed to the unconscious as “the essential basis of the psyche” and was “the authority whom Eduard von Hartmann followed.”5
The philosophers behind Jung
Immanuel Kant
One of Kant’s first steps toward the limits of knowledge was a book about a spirit-seer. In Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766) he set the visions of Emanuel Swedenborg beside the claims of rationalist metaphysics and concluded that philosophical knowledge of either is impossible, because human reason is limited to experience.6 Jung reached the same crossroads from the other side. His 1902 medical thesis studied the séances of a fifteen-and-a-half-year-old medium,2 and he worked near the edge where Swedenborg stood for the rest of his life (see Swedenborg’s visions and their place in Jung’s psychology). Paul Bishop’s study follows the idea of intellectual intuition through Kant and Swedenborg to Jung, and argues that Jung’s later theory of synchronicity grew out of a long preoccupation with problems such as the relation of mind and body.7
What Jung took from Kant was a discipline, used in three ways. The first was a ban on metaphysics. In 1912 he insisted that his work stayed “entirely in the territory of psychology” and called its method “a relentless fulfilment of the standpoint of the theory of cognition, established by Kant, not merely for the theory, but, what is more important, for the practice.”1 The second was a definition of the archetype. In 1921 he described archetypes as patterns “whose innermost nature is inaccessible to experience,” and added: “The archetype would be—to borrow from Kant—the noumenon of the image which intuition perceives and, in perceiving, creates.”3 We meet images; whatever stands behind them stays out of reach. The third was permission to think in purposes. Kant, Jung wrote in 1917, had shown that the mechanistic and the teleological views are “purely regulative (subjective) principles of thought,” not properties of nature, so a psychologist can use both without contradiction. In his view, “the nature of the human mind compels us to take the final point of view.”2
The same move gave Jung his phrase for the reality he worked with. Discussing Kant’s refutation of the ontological proof of God, with its hundred imagined thalers that are not a hundred real ones, Jung argued in 1921 that between esse in intellectu (being in thought) and esse in re (being in things) there is a third term, esse in anima, being in the soul. An image of God that organizes a person’s values is a psychological fact, whatever its metaphysical status.8 That is the logic behind what Jungians call psychic reality, and it is Kantian through and through: it sets aside the question of what exists beyond experience so that experience can be taken seriously.
Scholars still argue over how well Jung read Kant; Gary Clark contests the common charge that he misread him by bringing in Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) and its account of affect in aesthetic experience.9 Jung certainly broke his own rule. In the same 1921 passage he called archetypes the “precipitate” of ancestral experience, “a million times repeated,” a claim about biological inheritance that his Kantian limit should have ruled out.3 Christian Roesler’s review of the debate concludes that there is “still no firm scientific foundation” for the idea that complex symbolic patterns are transmitted so that every person has access to them.10 For how the concept has been reworked since, see the evolution of archetypes after Jung.
Friedrich Schelling, Carl Gustav Carus and Eduard von Hartmann
If Kant supplied the limit, the Romantics supplied the content. Before Freud, the unconscious already had a German history running from the aftermath of Kant through idealism and Romanticism.11 Schelling’s philosophy of nature, which took shape from 1797, and his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) treated nature as a producing subject that begins unconsciously and ends in consciousness.12 One direct trace in Jung is a 1912 footnote noting that Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology treats the “preconscious” as “the creative source.”1 Those texts come from lectures of the 1840s and were published only after Schelling’s death in 1854.12 S. J. McGrath’s book-length study argues that before Freud the unconscious was understood largely along Schelling’s lines, as a source of creative power, and reads Schelling’s later work as a speculative psychology of drive and dissociation.13
Carus’s Psyche (1846) and von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869), which ran to nine editions by 1882, turned that ground into a medical and then a popular idea. Jung’s 1912 book says that the uniformity of unconscious complexes he met in practice gave “an essential portion of the Schopenhauer and Hartmann philosophies a deep psychologic justification.”1 The inheritance shows in his refusal to treat the unconscious as a storeroom. “Causality is a point of view,” he wrote in 1917, and “finality is also a view-point”: some events become intelligible only when you ask what they are for.2
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
Goethe belongs here as a poet rather than a system. Jung’s Philemon was modeled on the Philemon of Ovid’s Metamorphoses and of Goethe’s Faust, where Faust’s land-clearing ends with the old couple Philemon and Baucis burned in their cottage. Jung carved “Philemonis Sacrum – Fausti Poenitentia” (Philemon’s shrine, Faust’s repentance) over the gate of his tower at Bollingen, and in 1942 wrote that he had “taken over Faust as my heritage.”14 Paul Bishop’s two-volume study of Jung, Goethe and Schiller argues that analytical psychology takes many of its central notions from German classical aesthetics.15
Arthur Schopenhauer
Schopenhauer gave Jung a model of psychic energy that is blind, impersonal and larger than the ego. In 1912 Jung kept the word libido because its meaning was “wide enough to cover all the unknown and countless manifestations of the Will in the sense of Schopenhauer.”1 In the 1916 lecture that introduced the impersonal unconscious, his worked example was a patient of his colleague Maeder, a locksmith’s apprentice who said the world was his picture-book. That, Jung wrote, “is just Schopenhauer’s world, conceived as will and representation, expressed in primitive picture-language.” The philosopher’s achievement was to abstract an image that arises in everyone: “The golden apples come from the same tree whether they are gathered by a locksmith’s apprentice or a Schopenhauer.”2
The term individuation turns up along this line too. Nietzsche borrowed Schopenhauer’s image of a sailor who trusts his frail boat on a raging sea, as the individual trusts the principle of individuation, to describe Apollo. Jung quoted the passage in his 1913 paper on types, and in 1921 he wrote that the ego owes its existence to the principium individuationis.2, 8
Friedrich Nietzsche
Nietzsche mattered to Jung both as an influence and as a warning. Jung read him as a student in Basel, and the publisher’s description of his seminar on Zarathustra, given from 1934 to 1939, says the works “had a lifelong influence on his thought.”16 His 1902 thesis already used Nietzsche diagnostically, showing that a passage in Zarathustra where sailors go ashore “to shoot rabbits” closely reproduces a ship’s log in Justinus Kerner’s Blätter aus Prevorst, which Nietzsche’s sister confirmed he had read between twelve and fifteen. Jung called it cryptomnesia: memory returning without being recognized as memory.2 By 1938 Nietzsche was his model case of inflation. “Because his God died, Nietzsche himself became a god; and this happened because he was no atheist,” Jung wrote, and for a man like that, declaring God dead is dangerous: “He becomes instantly a victim of ‘inflation.'”17 Paul Bishop and Lucy Huskinson have mapped this reception in detail.18, 19 For the personal side, see Nietzsche’s influence on Jung, and Jung’s countertransference to Nietzsche.
G. W. F. Hegel
Jung read Hegel closely and argued with him. In his 1913 paper on types, Jung offered Hegel’s attempt to settle the number of the planets in advance as an example of a thinker forcing facts into a priori constructions, and in the next sentence compared that habit to the delusional systems of paranoid patients.2 In 1921 he wrote that Hegel turns the idea into a hypostasis, the only thing that truly exists.8 That is exactly the step Kant had taught Jung not to take.
Plato
Jung’s best-known term has a Platonic ancestor. In his essay on the archetypes of the collective unconscious, he described “archetype” as an explanatory paraphrase of the Platonic eidos, the form behind the many copies of a thing.5 The difference is that Jung’s archetypes are not perfect ideas in a heaven of forms. They are patterns of the psyche, known only through the images, moods and stories they produce. Plato’s picture of a soul pulled between reason, spirit and appetite also anticipates the divided psyche that depth psychology set out to understand.
Plotinus and Neoplatonism
The Neoplatonists, above all Plotinus, imagined reality flowing out from a single source and the soul’s task as the long road back to it. Jung met that tradition again and again in his later studies of Gnosticism, Hermeticism and alchemy, where the world-soul, the descent of spirit into matter and its return became images of individuation. The same current runs through the Christian mystics Jung read closely, from Meister Eckhart to Jakob Boehme, and through the visions of Emanuel Swedenborg.
Philemon: experience before theory
Philemon is not a philosopher, but he belongs here because he is where the two traditions met in experience. According to the Philemon Foundation, the figure first appeared to Jung in a dream in 1913: an old man with the horns of a bull and the wings of a kingfisher, carrying a bunch of keys, flying across a sea-blue sky covered with clods of earth that were breaking apart. Jung painted the image because he did not understand it. In the interviews Aniela Jaffé recorded for Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung said Philemon “was simply a superior knowledge, and he taught me psychological objectivity and the actuality of the soul.”14 The published memoir was heavily edited, a story told in the censored material from Memories, Dreams, Reflections.
The dating matters, because Philemon is often credited with ideas already in print. Jung’s record of his “confrontation with the unconscious,” in the journals known as the Black Books, begins on 12 November 1913. In the Red Book, each of the Seven Sermons to the Dead, which Jung printed privately in 1916, is followed by a homily from Philemon.20 But the claim that unconscious complexes are uniform across people, and that this vindicates Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, was already in the 1912 book.1 And Jung read a paper on psychological types at the Munich psychoanalytic congress in September 1913, two months before that record begins.2 Philemon did not hand Jung a theory. He gave him a conviction.
Philemon is Romantic in content and Kantian in interpretation. A figure arrived on its own and seemed to know more than its host: the productive unconscious at work. Jung’s word for what it taught him, objectivity, is the Kantian part. The soul’s contents are real as psychic facts, whatever they are in themselves. The Red Book is the record of that experiment.
The philosophers around Jung
A second circle of thinkers worked alongside Jung or after him. Some knew his work well, some arrived at kindred ideas by other routes, and some disagreed with him in useful ways. Reading them beside Jung shows which of his ideas travel, and how.
Henri Bergson
Bergson’s philosophy of intuition and creative evolution was in the air when Jung was forming his ideas, and Jung noticed the kinship. His widened idea of libido, a general life energy rather than a sexual drive, sits close to Bergson’s élan vital, the creative impulse running through living things.2 Both men insisted that life could not be explained by mechanism alone, and both trusted intuition as a way of knowing.
Edmund Husserl
Husserl’s phenomenology asked philosophers to describe experience as it shows itself, before explaining it away. Jung described his own method as phenomenological in a similar sense: he wanted to describe the images of the psyche carefully before deciding what they are.
Roger Brooke’s Jung and Phenomenology (1991) makes a sustained case for reading Jung this way, and the description of its 2015 classic edition is candid. Jung “described his own approach as phenomenological,” but his “understanding of phenomenology was inconsistent,” and he wrote with an “epistemological eclecticism which leaves him often at cross purposes with himself.”21 That tension between careful description and bold speculation runs through all of Jung’s work.
Martin Heidegger
Being and Time appeared in 1927. The documented link between Jung and Heidegger is a third person. The Swiss psychiatrist Medard Boss spent nearly ten years in Jung’s study group for physicians. Ludwig Binswanger introduced him to Heidegger’s work in the 1930s; after the Second World War Boss began a twenty-five-year friendship with Heidegger and built Daseinsanalysis on it. For Heidegger’s own ideas and their clinical use, see Heidegger and the question of Being in psychotherapy.
Jean-Paul Sartre
Sartre is a useful opponent. In Being and Nothingness (1943) he rejected the idea of an unconscious altogether and argued that what looks like unconscious motivation is often bad faith, a way of hiding our own freedom from ourselves. Jung would have answered that the psyche really does produce contents the ego does not choose. Holding the two side by side sharpens a question every therapist faces: when is a pattern something that happens to a person, and when is it something they are still choosing?
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945) put the body at the center of experience: we do not just have bodies, we perceive and understand the world through them. That idea fits the side of Jung that took the body seriously, and it is one of the philosophical foundations of today’s body-based trauma therapies.
Ernst Cassirer
Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923–1929) described human beings as symbol-making animals who live in worlds built from myth, language, art and science. Jung and Cassirer worked separately, but they share a conviction that myth is not primitive error. It is a way the mind organizes experience, and it still shapes modern life.
Gaston Bachelard
Bachelard, a philosopher of science who turned to the poetic imagination, drew openly on Jung. In The Poetics of Reverie (1960) he used Jung’s anima and animus to explore daydreaming, and his studies of fire, water, air and earth read the elements as images the psyche lives in. His Poetics of Space (1958) does for houses and rooms what Jung did for dreams.
Henry Corbin
Henry Corbin is a different case: a colleague. He was Heidegger’s first French translator, first attended the Eranos conferences at Ascona in 1949, valued Jung’s ideas of the collective unconscious and active imagination, and became an important source for James Hillman’s archetypal psychology. His mundus imaginalis belongs to the conversation around Jung’s late work, not to its foundations.
Gilbert Durand
Gilbert Durand was a follower of Bachelard, Corbin and Jung, so that influence ran from Jung outward.
Jean Gebser
Gebser’s The Ever-Present Origin (1949–1953) traced human consciousness through a series of structures, archaic, magical, mythical, mental and integral, each still present beneath the next. Like Jung, he saw consciousness emerging from older layers that never disappear, and he hoped for an integration of those layers rather than a victory of the rational mind over the rest.
Gilbert Simondon
Simondon also wrote about individuation, in his 1958 thesis, but he meant something different: the process by which any individual, from a crystal to a person, forms out of a field of tension. Reading him beside Jung is a good way to see what is specific to Jung’s use of the word, the lifelong work of becoming a whole self.
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Gadamer’s Truth and Method (1960) described understanding as a dialogue in which the interpreter’s own horizon meets the text’s. That is close to how Jungian dream work proceeds: the dream is not decoded with a key but understood through a conversation between the dreamer and the image.
Peter Sloterdijk
Sloterdijk, born in 1947, belongs to a much later generation, but his Spheres trilogy (1998–2004) takes up questions Jung would recognize: the shared inner spaces people build together, from the bond between mother and infant to religions and nations. His work is a bridge between depth psychology and the metamodern thinking explored elsewhere on this blog.
What this means in therapy
Each of the real influences leaves a habit in how a Jungian-informed therapist works. The Kantian habit is restraint about meaning. When someone brings a dream of a flood, or an inner figure who seems to speak with authority, the therapist does not know what the image “really is” and should not pretend to. The image is treated as real in the sense of esse in anima: real as experience, with effects on mood, choices and relationships, while what it proves about the world stays an open question. That protects people in both directions: a powerful dream is neither dismissed as noise nor turned into a literal prophecy.
The Romantic habit is asking what a symptom is for. Alongside “where did this come from?” the work asks “what is this trying to do?” A dread that arrives every Sunday night, a recurring dream of missing an exam, a sudden fascination with a person: Jung’s final point of view treats these as attempts at adjustment, not only as damage, and the question can bring up material a purely causal history misses.
The Nietzschean habit is watchfulness about inflation. Large inner experiences, religious or creative, sometimes leave a person identifying with the image: the chosen one, the prophet, the only one who sees clearly. Jung’s reading of Nietzsche treats that as a danger, not an achievement, and part of the therapist’s job is to help the person keep human size. Experiences like these that come with lost sleep, racing thoughts or a sense of special mission also call for a medical and psychiatric assessment, not only for interpretation.
Christian Roesler’s 2013 review summarized naturalistic and retrospective studies of Jungian therapy, mostly from Germany and Switzerland, that found improvements in symptoms and interpersonal problems lasting up to six years, after an average of about 90 sessions.22 These were not randomized trials, and a later paper by Roesler and Reefschläger calls for exactly that kind of research.23 Jonathan Shedler’s review of the wider psychodynamic family found effect sizes as large as those reported for therapies promoted as “evidence based,” with patients keeping their gains and appearing to keep improving after treatment ended.24 That supports depth-oriented therapy as a reasonable option. It does not make any school’s philosophy true. Jungian depth therapy at Taproot uses these habits alongside other methods, and fits them to the person rather than to the theory.
To start reading the philosophy behind Jung, try Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, then Schopenhauer, then Jung’s short 1916 lecture on the unconscious, which is freely available. If the questions here are personal rather than academic, you can read more about Jungian therapy in Hoover or get in touch to ask whether it fits what you are dealing with.
References
- Jung, C. G. (1916). Psychology of the unconscious: A study of the transformations and symbolisms of the libido (B. M. Hinkle, Trans.). Moffat, Yard and Company. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/65903
- Jung, C. G. (1917). Collected papers on analytical psychology (C. E. Long, Ed.; 2nd ed.). Baillière, Tindall and Cox. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48225
- Jung, C. G. (1923). Psychological types, or the psychology of individuation (H. G. Baynes, Trans.). Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. https://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Jung/types.htm
- Jung, C. G. (1976). The symbolic life: Miscellaneous writings (Collected Works, Vol. 18). Princeton University Press.
- Jung, C. G. (1969). The archetypes and the collective unconscious (2nd ed., Collected Works, Vol. 9, Pt. 1). Princeton University Press.
- Rohlf, M. (2024). Immanuel Kant. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/
- Bishop, P. (2000). Synchronicity and intellectual intuition in Kant, Swedenborg, and Jung. Edwin Mellen Press.
- Jung, C. G. (1921). Psychologische Typen. Rascher. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/61543
- Clark, G. (2023). Rethinking Jung’s reception of Kant and the Naturphilosophen: Archetypes, evolutionary developmental biology and the future of analytical psychology. International Journal of Jungian Studies, 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1163/19409060-bja10032
- Roesler, C. (2012). Are archetypes transmitted more by culture than biology? Questions arising from conceptualizations of the archetype. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 57(2), 223–246. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5922.2011.01963.x
- Nicholls, A., & Liebscher, M. (Eds.). (2010). Thinking the unconscious: Nineteenth-century German thought. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511712272
- Bowie, A. (2023). Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schelling/
- McGrath, S. J. (2012). The dark ground of spirit. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203134399
- Philemon Foundation. (n.d.). Who is Philemon? Retrieved November 8, 2026, from https://philemonfoundation.org/about-philemon/who-is-philemon/
- Bishop, P. (2007). Analytical psychology and German classical aesthetics: Goethe, Schiller, and Jung (Vol. 1). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203960882
- Jung, C. G. (2012). Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: Notes of the seminar given in 1934–1939 (J. L. Jarrett, Ed.). Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400843107 (Original work published 1988)
- Jung, C. G. (1938). Psychology and religion. Yale University Press. https://archive.org/details/x-psychology-religion
- Bishop, P. (1995). The Dionysian self. Walter de Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110811704
- Huskinson, L. (2004). Nietzsche and Jung: The whole self in the union of opposites. Brunner-Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203508299
- Jung, C. G. (2009). The red book: Liber novus (S. Shamdasani, Ed.; M. Kyburz, J. Peck, & S. Shamdasani, Trans.). W. W. Norton.
- Brooke, R. (2015). Jung and phenomenology (Classic ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315766690 (Original work published 1991)
- Roesler, C. (2013). Evidence for the effectiveness of Jungian psychotherapy: A review of empirical studies. Behavioral Sciences, 3(4), 562–575. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs3040562
- Roesler, C., & Reefschläger, G. I. (2022). Jungian psychotherapy, spirituality, and synchronicity: Theory, applications, and evidence base. Psychotherapy, 59(3), 339–350. https://doi.org/10.1037/pst0000402
- Shedler, J. (2010). The efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy. American Psychologist, 65(2), 98–109. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018378



























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